究竟是什么关系――中国取向电工钢反补贴和反倾销案上诉机构裁决的思路

来源:未知    作者:admin    发布时间:2020/5/31 5:10:21    
【关键词】WTO上诉机构;价格压低;调查机关
【写作年份】2012年


【正文】

  2012年10月18日,WTO上诉机构就“中国取向电工钢反补贴和反倾销案”(China-Countervailing and Anti-dumping Duties on Grain Oriented Flat-rolled Electrical Steel from the United States,DS414)发布报告。本案的一个焦点问题是:反倾销协定第3条第2款和反补贴协定第15条第2款究竟给调查机关设定了怎样的义务(这两款的文字相同,只是分属于两个协定,分别关于倾销和补贴。相关条款见附件)。

  中国认为:Articles 3.2 and 15.2 merely require an investigating authority to consider the existence of price depression or suppression, and do not require the establishment of any link between subject imports and these price effects.上诉机构认为:the Panel did not err in not adopting China's interpretation.

  专家组认为:Having regard to the text of the relevant provisions, we note that the analysis envisaged by the second sentence of Article 3.2 of the Anti?Dumping Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement concerns “the effect of the (dumped/subsidized) imports on prices.” Furthermore, the authority must consider whether “the effect of (dumped/subsidized) imports is … to depress prices to a significant degree”。 Accordingly, merely showing the existence of significant price depression does not suffice for the purposes of Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement. An authority must also show that such price depression is an effect of the subject imports…an investigating authority must demonstrate that price depression is an effect of subject imports.上诉机构认为:We note that the Panel began its analysis by stating, correctly, that Articles 3.2 and 15.2 require an investigating authority to “consider” whether the effect of subject imports is price depression. The Panel nonetheless went on to use the words “show” and “demonstrate”, which seem to suggest a different standard. In our view, to the extent the Panel used the words “show” and “demonstrate” to mean that an authority is required to make a definitive determination, the Panel's use of these words is not consistent with a proper understanding of the word “consider” in Articles 3.2 and 15.2. However, to the extent the Panel used the words “show” and “demonstrate” to mean that the authority's consideration of price effects must be reflected in relevant documentation produced by the authority in its investigation, and must be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination, this is consistent with our interpretation, set out above, that the consideration of price effects must conform to the standard in Articles 3.1 and 15.1 and be reflected in relevant documentation.上诉机构的意思是:专家组认为调查机关应当consider是对的,但是调查机关应当show和demonstrate,则既对又不对了。

  最后,上诉机构的结论是:we consider that Articles 3.2 and 15.2 require an investigating authority to consider the relationship between subject imports and prices of like domestic products, so as to understand whether subject imports provide explanatory force for the occurrence of significant depression or suppression of domestic prices.也就是说,调查机关应当考虑进口与国内产品价格之间的关系,以便于理解进口是否解释了国内价格压低或抑制的出现。从这个结论看,调查机关的义务是:仅仅“考虑”(consider)是不够的;这种“考虑”还要有一定效果。换句话说,中国认为调查机关不需要确立进口与价格影响之间的任何关系(do not require the establishment of any link between subject imports and these price effects),是不对的。而专家组认为调查机关需要就二者做出一个“最终决定”(a definitive determination),也是不对的。上诉机构似乎是说:调查机关的义务,是从“考虑”走向“最终决定”之间的状态,也就是这种“考虑”应当有利于做出“最终决定”。

  上诉机构得出这一结论,使用的是条约解释的基本方法。

  一、第3条和第15条关于损害确定的框架

  上诉机构决定先看一下第3条和第15条的框架,即第2款所设义务的上下文,然后再处理该款的解释问题。

  上诉机构援引先例,认为第1款是关于确定损害这一义务的总体条款(overarching provision),包括要有积极证据(positive evidence)并客观审查(objec?tive examination)以下因素:(i) the volume of subject imports; (ii) the effect of such imports on the prices of like domestic products; and (iii) the consequent impact of such imports on the domestic producers of the like products.,其他款项都是进一步说明这些内容的,其中第2款就是关于(i) 和(ii)的,而第4款和第5款是关于(iii)的。因此,这些条款一起,对调查机关进行损害和因果关系分析设定了框架和纪律。具体而言,第5款是关于因果关系分析的,但是倾销或补贴所造成的损害是通过第2款和第4款所说的影响而实现的(例如,第3条第5款:It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4)。因此,第2款和第4款所要求的审查,是回答第5款的因果关系这一最终问题所必须的。下文还将提到,对第2款的解释,必须与该条确定损害这一总体任务相一致。

  二、“考虑”(Consider)的义务

  第2款用了两个consider。根据字典的含义,consider是要求决策者“考虑某事”(take something into account)。关于进口数量及其对国内价格的影响,这个词并未要求调查机关做出最终决定(definitive determination)。但是consider也必须遵守第1款所设定的总体原则,即要有积极证据和进行客观审查。换句话说,不要求做出最终决定,并没有减少第2款所指的严格分析。

  此外,尽管“考虑”某事与“最终决定”某事应有区别,但这一区别并未减少调查机关所应考虑事项的范围。也就是说,调查机关仅仅需要考虑,而不是做出最后决定,并未改变第2款所要求考虑的事项,包括进口压低价格或者抑制价格上升到某一程度的影响(effect)。下文将讨论这一要求的含义。最后,调查机关的“考虑”,还必须反映在相关文件中,例如调查机关的最终裁决中,以便利害关系方核实调查机关是否真的“考虑”了这些因素。

  三、考虑进口的影响是否为压低价格或抑制价格上升

  1、第2款的文字

  (反倾销协定第3条)第2款第二句的内容是:With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigat?ing author?ities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercut?ting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like prod?uct of the importing Mem?ber, or whether the effect of such imports is other?wise to depress prices to a signifi?cant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.

  上诉机构认为,“effect”一词的字典含义表明,它是某事的结果。尽管“effect”可以独立于导致它的因素而使用,但对于第2款,却不属于这种情况,而是要求审查进口影响国内价格的某些因素,并且每个因素都将进口与国内价格联系起来。

  首先,调查机关必须考虑“whether there has been a significant price undercut?ting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like prod?uct of the importing Mem?ber.”因此,关于大幅价格削低,通过要求比较进口价格与国内价格,第2款明确建了二者之间的联系。其次,调查机关要考虑进口对国内价格的影响是否为大幅压低或抑制,特别是要考虑价格影响是否为进口之后果。此外,“to depress prices” 和 “(to) prevent price increases”所表达的句法关系为:主体(进口)对客体(国内价格)做了某事。因此,第2款明确将大幅价格压低和抑制与进口联系起来,要求审查进口与国内价格这两个变量之间的关系。具体而言,调查机关应当考虑第一个变量(进口)对于第二个变量(国内价格)大幅压低或抑制的出现是否具有解释效力(an investigating authority is required to consider whether a first variable—that is, subject imports—has explanatory force for the occurrence of significant depression or suppression of a second variable—that is, domestic prices.)

  关于价格削低和价格压低/抑制这两个事项的审查,用“or”和“otherwise”分开了,表明两项审查所考虑的因素可能不同。因此,即使进口没有削低国内价格,也可能会有压低或抑制效果。

  由于第2款要求审查进口与国内价格之间的关系,因此调查机关为了考虑价格大幅压低或抑制而将其考虑的范围限于国内价格发生了什么变化,这是不够的。例如,在考虑大幅价格压低时,仅仅确定了价格下降趋势,或者在分析大幅价格抑制时,仅仅看到了价格未如预期般上升,这是不够的。调查机关应当结合进口一起审查,以确定进口对价格压低或抑制是否具有解释效力。此外,第2款的“the effect of such (dumped or subsidized) imports”表明,这种影响时来自于进口的某些相关方面的,包括价格及/或数量。

  这种解释得到了价格压低(price depression)和价格抑制(price suppression)这两个概念的加强。“price depression”是指价格被某物推低或减少的情况,因此从定义上看,审查“price depression”就不仅仅是简单地看到了价格下降,还应当包括分析是什么推低了价格。至于“price suppression”,第2款要求调查机关考虑:“whether the effect of” subject imports is “(to) prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree”。从条款看,如果不考虑没有进口则价格是否会上升这种情况,是不可能适当审查“price suppression”的。这两个概念都暗含着要分析究竟是什么导致了这种价格现象的问题。因此,第2款所要求的考虑大幅价格压低或抑制,从定义看是包括分析国内价格是否受到了进口压低或抑制的。

  2、第2款的上下文

  前文提到,第3条和第15条的众多条款对调查机关进行损害和因果关系分析设定了框架和纪律。这些条款为调查机关推导出最终的损害和因果关系裁决提供了逻辑的演进。不仅如此,第5款的措辞,即“through the effects of” dumping or subsidies “(a)s set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4”表明,第2款和第4款的分析是回答第5款的因果关系问题所必需的,即这些分析的结果构成了第5款整体因果关系分析的基础。具体到本案,第2款的上下文表明,这个分析是为了得出因果关系的总体结论。对价格压低和抑制这两个价格影响的分析,是为了理解进口是否具有解释效力,以便于调查机关确定进口是否通过其价格影响正在对国内产业造成损害,即第5款的规定。因此,第2款上下文所支持的观点是:调查机关必须分析进口与国内价格之间的关系,特别是进口对大幅价格压低或抑制是否具有解释效力,以构成第5款所指因果关系分析的基础。

  上诉机构进一步解释:认为第2款要求考虑进口与国内价格之间的关系,并不会导致对第5款的因果关系进行重复分析。相反,两者的分析是不同的:第5款是对进口与损害之间关系的分析,而第2款是对进口与一个不同的变量,即国内价格之间关系的分析。如前所述,对后者的理解构成了第5款损害和因果关系分析的基础。此外,第5款要求调查机关证明进口正在造成损害“through the effects of” dumping or subsidies “(a)s set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4”,而第4款是要求调查机关审查依据影响产业状况的所有有关经济因素和指标审查进口对国内产业的影响,并且列出了调查机关应当评估的一些因素和指标。因此,第5款包含了所有相关证据,包括第2款所指的进口数量和价格影响,以及第4款所指的经济因素。也就是说,从定义上看,根据第5款所进行审查的范围,大于第2款所指的价格压制和抑制因素。最后,上诉机构指出,第5款要求调查机关:“examine any known factors other than the (dumped or subsidized) imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry”, and to ensure that “the injuries caused by these other factors (are not) attributed to the (dumped or subsidized) imports”。相比之下,第2款要求调查机关分析进口与国内价格之间的关系,以便于理解进口对大幅价格压低或抑制是否具有解释效力,而没有像第5款那样,要求调查机关对所有已知因素进行全面详尽的分析,或者区分这些因素所造成的损害。

  3、第3条和第15条的宗旨

  针对中国提出的观点,即将第2款解释为更为有限的义务(即仅要求调查机关考虑价格压制或抑制的存在,而不要求确定进口与价格影响之间的关系),是符合在价格影响问题上留给调查机关任意决定权(discretion)这一“宗旨和目的”的,上诉机构认为,根据第2款的要求,考虑进口对大幅价格压低或抑制是否有解释效力,并非调查机关的任意决定权,而是第3条和第15条整体框架和纪律的组成部分。这两条的目的是要求调查机关确定损害和因果关系,不能支持对第2款的限制性解释。

  四、总结

  最后,上诉机构的总结如下:

  In sum, we reach the above interpretation on the basis of the text and context of Article 3.2 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article 15.2 of the SCM Agreement, together with the objective of Articles 3 and 15 discerned from various paragraphs thereunder. Specifically, with regard to price depression and suppression under the second sentence of Articles 3.2 and 15.2, an investigating authority is required to consider the relationship between subject imports and prices of like domestic products, so as to understand whether subject imports provide explanatory force for the occurrence of significant depression or suppression of domestic prices. The outcome of this inquiry will enable the authority to advance its analysis, and to have a meaningful basis for its determination as to whether subject imports, through such price effects, are causing injury to the domestic industry. Moreover, the inquiry under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 does not duplicate the different and broader examination regarding the causal relationship between subject imports and injury to the domestic industry pursuant to Articles 3.5 and 15.5. Neither do Articles 3.2 and 15.2 require an authority to conduct an exhaustive and fully fledged non-attribution analysis regarding all possible factors that may be causing injury to the domestic industry. Rather, the investigating authority's inquiry under Articles 3.2 and 15.2 is focused on the relationship between subject imports and domestic prices, and the authority may not disregard evidence that calls into question the explanatory force of the former for significant depression or suppression of the latter.

  附件:

  Article 3 of the Anti?Dumping Agreement

  Determination of Injury[1]

  3.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objec?tive examination of both (a) the volume of the dumped imports and the effect of the dumped imports on prices in the domestic market for like products, and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on dom?estic producers of such products.

  3.2 With regard to the volume of the dumped imports, the investigat?ing auth?or?ities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in dumped imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the dumped imports on prices, the investigat?ing author?ities shall consider whether there has been a significant price undercut?ting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like prod?uct of the importing Mem?ber, or whether the effect of such imports is other?wise to depress prices to a signifi?cant degree or prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.

  3.4 The examination of the impact of the dumped imports on the domestic indus?try concerned shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in sales, profits, output, market share, productivity, return on investments, or utiliz?ation of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employ?ment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments. This list is not exhaus?tive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

  3.5 It must be demonstrated that the dumped imports are, through the effects of dumping, as set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4, causing injury within the mean?ing of this Agreement. The demonstration of a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the dumped imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volume and prices of imports not sold at dumping prices, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of consumption, trade-restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, develop?ments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.

  Article 15 of the SCM Agreement

  Determination of Injury[2]

  15.1 A determination of injury for purposes of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination of both (a) the volume of the subsidized imports and the effect of the subsidized imports on prices in the domestic market for like products[3] and (b) the consequent impact of these imports on the domestic producers of such products.

  15.2 With regard to the volume of the subsidized imports, the investigating auth?orities shall consider whether there has been a significant increase in subsi?dized imports, either in absolute terms or relative to production or consumption in the importing Member. With regard to the effect of the subsidized imports on prices, the investigating authorities shall consider whether there has been a sig?nificant price undercutting by the subsidized imports as compared with the price of a like product of the importing Member, or whether the effect of such imports is otherwise to depress prices to a significant degree or to prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree. No one or several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.

  15.4 The examination of the impact of the subsidized imports on the domestic industry shall include an evaluation of all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry, including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on invest?ments, or utiliz?ation of capacity; factors affecting domestic prices; actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, ability to raise capital or investments and, in the case of agriculture, whether there has been an increased burden on government support programmes. This list is not exhaustive, nor can one or several of these factors necessarily give decisive guidance.

  15.5 It must be demonstrated that the subsidized imports are, through the effects[4] of subsidies, causing injury within the meaning of this Agreement. The demonstra?tion of a causal relationship between the subsidized imports and the injury to the domestic industry shall be based on an examination of all relevant evidence before the authorities. The authorities shall also examine any known factors other than the subsidized imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry, and the injuries caused by these other factors must not be attributed to the subsidized imports. Factors which may be relevant in this respect include, inter alia, the volumes and prices of non?subsidized imports of the product in question, contraction in demand or changes in the patterns of con?sumption, trade restrictive practices of and competition between the foreign and domestic producers, developments in technology and the export performance and productivity of the domestic industry.




【作者简介】
杨国华,男,1965年3月生。1996年毕业于北京大学法律系,获法学博士学位。现任中华人民共和国商务部条约法律司副司长。2006年1月至2008年9月,任中国驻美大使馆知识产权专员。此前任商务部条约法律司WTO法律处处长,负责与中国有关的WTO争端解决事务。还曾负责外国对华反倾销的应诉、中外知识产权谈判与合作、外经贸部“WTO法律工作组”(为适应加入WTO需要修改、制订法律)的工作。参加了中国加入WTO多边和双边谈判。


【注释】
[1]Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be inter?preted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
[2]Under this Agreement the term “injury” shall, unless otherwise specified, be taken to mean material injury to a domestic industry, threat of material injury to a domestic industry or material retardation of the establishment of such an industry and shall be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
[3]Throughout this Agreement the term “like product” (“produit similaire”) shall be interpreted to mean a product which is identical, i.e. alike in all respects to the product under consideration, or in the absence of such a product, another product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under consideration.
[4]As set forth in paragraphs 2 and 4.
 
.....................................................................................................................................................